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Abstract 
 
This paper explores potential channels through which information technology (IT) 
affects economic development. The channel emphasized here is the reduction of 
transaction costs through the use of information technology. We discuss the nature of 
transaction costs, their possible impacts on economic outcomes, and the impacts of IT on 
transaction costs. We provide a theoretical discussion of how a reduction in transaction 
costs may affect the number of intermediate goods that are produced, and in turn how that 
number may affect the development path of the economy.  We then draw on our 
fieldwork in rural India that examined the economics of rural Internet kiosks, and relate 
this multifaceted case study to the theoretical discussion of transaction costs. We 
conclude with a broader discussion of the potential impact of IT on developing 
economies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The problem of economic development, or, rather, its lack, has bedeviled us since 
colonialism ended, and former colonies became ‘developing countries.’ There have been 
some spectacular success stories, but also many failures of development. The result of 
over fifty years of diverse experiences has been a reasonable degree of agreement among 
professional economists as to the broad nature of the economic policies that must be 
followed to promote economic development. One can partly relate this intellectual 
convergence to the economic success of East Asia and the economic failure of the Soviet 
Union, both of which became clear only in the last decade or two. Coincidentally, the 
same period has seen the emergence of information technology (IT) as a major force for 
change in developed countries. While the virtues of IT have sometimes been overblown, 
almost to the point of mania, one can assert without too much fear of contradiction that 
IT has begun to have a significant impact on the lives of people in developed, 
industrialized countries. 
 
The benefits of IT for developing countries are less clear-cut. IT can improve 
efficiency, make developing country firms more globally competitive, and bring many 
benefits to well-off consumers in these countries, whose consumption patterns are close 
to those of the developed world. From this perspective, IT is a rich-world tool, of limited 
relevance to the poor masses of developing countries, who lack basic health, sanitation 
and education. On the other hand, there have been numerous attempts to harness the 
power of IT in developing countries, to try to improve the delivery of such basic services, 
as well as provide other services that might have been deemed inaccessible to poor, 
isolated villagers. Dozens of case studies, newspaper articles and web sites describe 
various achievements in the use of IT to improve the lives of the poor in poor countries. 
 
What is chiefly missing from the debate on the role of IT in promoting economic 
development is a unifying conceptual framework for identifying the gains from IT for 
rural populations in developing countries. This paper provides a beginning in this 
direction by focusing on transaction costs, how IT affects them, and how they affect 
development. We argue that IT can significantly reduce the high transaction costs that 
face poor, rural populations, and that this can have a long-lasting positive impact on 
economic development. Since we rely on a combination of abstract modeling with 
informal empirical evidence through case studies, there is no claim that the argument 
presented here is conclusive – however, we provide a framework for further theoretical 
and empirical investigation.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general discussion of the 
concrete role of IT in reducing transaction costs for rural households in developing 
economies, as well as its more general impacts. Section 3 provides an abstract theoretical 
discussion, laying out the short-run and long-run impacts of reducing transaction costs on 
economic development. This section draws on models of ‘new growth theory,’ and adds 
transaction costs to these models. Section 4 uses our own fieldwork in India, to examine Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  2
how IT is used in practice, and to get some idea of its qualitative and quantitative 
impacts. Section 5 briefly concludes, with some more general thoughts on the role of IT 
in development, including impacts on inequality, expectations, and innovation processes. 
 
 
2. Transaction Costs and Information Technology
1
   
While there is no standard definition of the term ‘transaction costs’, they can be 
broadly interpreted to include costs associated with market exchange, including costs of 
searching for options, negotiating contracts and enforcing agreements.
2 Payments to 
transaction intermediaries can also be transaction costs, since, in such cases, the 
intermediary provides costly transaction services, rather than the parties bearing the costs 
directly. One can also interpret some transportation costs as transaction costs, since they 
may be required to identify a possible transaction, or to complete it. In this case, as in the 
case of intermediation, transaction costs are somewhat of a catch-all term for various 
economically valuable activities that facilitate economic exchanges. We will accept this 
limitation of the term ‘transaction cost,’ and highlight varying interpretations where 
necessary. 
 
Turning to the role of IT, its general economic benefit is that its use may lead to 
static and dynamic efficiency gains.
3 Static gains are one-time, and come from more 
efficient use of scarce resources, allowing higher consumption in the present. More 
efficient use of resources can include improvements in operating efficiency, as well as 
reduced transaction costs, though the conceptual boundary between these two avenues 
may not always be hard and fast.
4 Dynamic gains come from higher growth, potentially 
raising the entire future stream of consumption. Simply freeing up current resources 
through reducing transaction costs can lead to higher growth – in this case, the impacts of 
lower transaction costs are merely through a conventional channel. On the other hand, as 
we examine in Section 3, there may be less obvious consequences of transaction costs for 
growth.  
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on Singh (2004). See also Singh (2002), and the concluding section of this 
paper for a broader discussion of the potential role of IT in development. See Kaushik and Singh (2004) for 
references to the growing literature on the subject. 
2 While Coase (1937) does not use the term, his ‘marketing costs’ are the essence of the modern concept. 
Williamson, for example (1975, 1981), extends the analysis of transaction costs to relationships within 
organizations.   
3 Equity is often paired with efficiency in concerns for welfare. Depending how IT is deployed and 
accessed, the impact on inequality can go either way. However, to the extent that transaction costs are 
relatively higher for poorer people, the benefits of IT may be greater for the poor, if they can access IT-
based tools in an affordable manner. A related issue is that development can also include improvements in 
the capabilities of the population, such as education, health and nutrition, independently of the direct or 
indirect economic impact of these improvements. The ability to participate in democratic decision-making 
can also be placed in this category. IT may also effect improvements along these ‘non-economic’ 
dimensions: see Section 5 for further discussion. 
4 Essentially, this is because transaction costs can be interpreted to include internal firm decision-making 
and implementation costs, as well as market-related transaction costs. Also, the choice of whether market-
related transaction costs are incurred or not is endogenous to the system, and depends on the relative costs 
of organizing production in different ways: this is, of course, the basic insight of Coase (1937). Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  3
 
  To discuss the efficiency impacts of IT more concretely, note that IT in our usage 
refers to the electronic processing, storage and communication of information, where 
anything that can be represented in digital form is included in the term ‘information.’ 
Thus news, entertainment, personal communications, educational material, blank and 
filled-out forms, announcements, schedules, and so on are all information. Software 
programs that process data (searching, tabulating, and calculating, for example) are also 
information in this sense, representing a particular kind of intermediate good. We can use 
standard economic characterizations to classify the different kinds of information. For 
example, entertainment, personal communications, and sometimes news, are final goods. 
Educational material, job announcements, or some kinds of news (weather news for 
farmers, for example) are intermediate goods, typically used for improving income-
earning opportunities. Information about products and services available in the market is 
also an intermediate good, which can reduce transaction costs for those products. 
 
  The ability to share information among users can impact the feasibility of 
providing it on a commercial basis: information goods typically have the characteristic 
that one person’s use does not reduce their availability for another person. Thus, a 
message or weather news can be viewed by many people, either simultaneously or 
sequentially. Depending on the content of the news or message, different people may 
place different valuations on the information. Only friends and relatives may be 
interested in a personal message, all farmers in a district may be interested in local 
weather news, and so on. The use of IT can dramatically increase the shareability of 
information, and this affects the economics of private and public provision of information 
goods and services. 
 
For both public and private provision, IT can increase efficiency by economizing 
on resource use in the operations of firms, as well as in market transactions. Information 
that would otherwise be conveyed through face-to-face contact, post, courier, print 
delivery, telegraph or telephone may instead be communicated in digital electronic form 
via the Internet. The Internet and other digital technologies can also make telephones and 
printing more efficient, so the role of IT is much more pervasive than simply substitution 
of the Internet for existing methods. However, a central advantage of the Internet is its 
potential for enabling detailed two-way information exchange at relatively low cost.
5 
Efficiency benefits of IT are not restricted to just the process of communication. IT can 
make it possible to track and analyze communications, or, more generally, to store and 
retrieve information. In fact, word processing, maintaining accounts, inventory 
management, and many such activities that do not necessarily require long-distance 
communications or physical movement are also made more efficient by IT. 
 
Experience with Internet use in developed countries suggests that information 
exchange related to the completion of market transactions is especially valuable. The 
ability of IT-based communications (combined with storage and processing) to bring 
                                                 
5 Of course, IT also requires new investment, so the benefits of trips, time and paper saved must be 
weighed against the costs of installing and maintaining the new infrastructure. This is a standard economic 
calculation. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  4
together buyers and sellers more effectively represents major potential gains. These gains 
can come about through lower search costs, and the resulting improvement in matching 
of buyers and sellers. The successes of auction and employment websites in the US 
illustrate these gains. In a developing country, farmers selling their crops and buying 
inputs, parents seeking matrimonial alliances for their children, and job seekers could all 
be potential users of Internet-based matching services. 
 
Efficiency gains of IT can also come about through the enabling of new goods 
and services. In many cases, the new good is related to something available earlier, but is 
presented in a form that reduces costs and expands the size of the market. For example, 
recorded music is a mass-consumption item, whereas only a small minority of the 
population could afford or have access to live performances by the highest quality 
musicians.  In this case, while digital recording reduced production costs, digital delivery 
has reduced transaction costs, and further expanded the market. Educational material is 
another example where recording and duplication can replace more expensive, skilled-
labor-intensive alternatives for delivery. The possibilities for interactivity with IT-based 
educational materials illustrate the advantages of IT over older technologies based only 
on recording and duplication. Long-distance interactive communication in educational 
contexts can also be considered as a reduction in transaction costs, since physical travel is 
eliminated or reduced. 
 
IT may also play an important role in reducing the transaction costs associated 
with the provision of public goods and with redistributive transfer payments. Citizens, 
especially in developing countries, typically incur private costs (often substantial) in 
availing of government-provided services.
6  Reducing these costs requires the internal use 
of IT by government, as well as enabling the beneficiaries of government services 
(particularly the economically disadvantaged) to access IT resources also. While 
governments may invest in such front-end interfaces with citizens (and have done so in 
developed countries), the cost of doing so for governments in developing countries may 
be prohibitive. Such governments typically already have difficulties in raising sufficient 
resources through taxes and user charges for traditional public sector activities. However, 
successful examples of implementation of ‘e-governance’ initiatives do exist.
7 There is 
also a conceptual alternative that economizes on government resources. The use of IT can 
increase the scope for private provision of intermediary services that reduce the cost of 
access to government. Private intermediaries already help in filling out forms, getting 
access, and so on, but IT can reduce costs further, often by an order of magnitude. In 
broad terms (as is also the case with electronic marketplaces and job-matching boards), 
IT changes the scope and nature of intermediation. 
 
  In developing countries, ‘cyber kiosks’ have already proliferated in cities and 
larger towns, with usage patterns often quite similar to those in developed countries. 
Urban population densities, income levels, cultural attitudes and telecom infrastructure all 
                                                 
6 These transaction costs include government officials illegally demanding ‘speed money’ or other 
payments.  
7 In India, these include Bhoomi in Karnataka, e-seva in Andhra Pradesh, Lokmitra in Rajasthan, and the 
CHOICE Project in Chattisgarh. See also Bhatnagar and Schware (2000) for further examples. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  5
seem to be sufficient for the commercial success of these enterprises. The falling cost of 
hardware and a variety of software have also supported this trend. However, one can 
argue that sustained and broad-based economic development requires improved 
productivity and more efficient resource use in rural areas. On the other hand, in rural 
areas the various demographic and socioeconomic variables may not be present in 
configurations that would easily enable the diffusion of commercial access to various IT-
enabled services. Other barriers include the market power of traditional rural 
intermediaries and local language requirements and different demand patterns for 
software. Nevertheless, a case can be made that transaction costs are relatively
8 very high 
in rural areas of developing countries, and that IT can bring those costs down. The issue 
may be one of cost-effective provision of IT access, rather than the absence of IT-based 
efficiency gains. 
 
We therefore briefly discuss, in somewhat more specific terms, the potential 
impacts of rural IT use in developing countries. Possible sources of demand for IT-based 
services can be framed in terms of a flow diagram representing the decisions of rural 
households. We will treat a typical household as engaged in farming, though this will not 
be true for all of them. Figure 1 presents a simplified representation of the various 
economic decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Operations   Selling  Inputs 
Consumption 
Human capital 
Saving 
Figure 1 
 
.  
Beginning from the left of Figure 1, input decisions include material inputs such 
as seeds, fertilizer and pesticides; and capital inputs such as tractors and land (whether 
through purchases or rentals); as well as the credit required for such purposes. The focus 
of analysis will be market transactions for inputs, in keeping with the emphasis on 
transaction costs. In all cases, there is a potential for benefiting through better 
                                                 
8 While urban residents may also face significant transaction costs in making purchases, or accessing 
government services, they may be lower in absolute terms than for rural populations, because the latter face 
higher transportation costs, and they may also be lower relative to incomes. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  6
information about prices, quality and availability. Labor is also an important input, but 
the labor market has special characteristics (lack of mobility, contracting, relationship 
factors, etc.) that reduce the importance of such information in rural contexts.  
 
Operations include decisions with respect to quantity and timing of inputs. A 
crucial aspect of agricultural operations is risk management, as both the weather and pest 
incidence are extremely variable. Both ex ante decisions in the face of uncertainty and ex 
post responses to realizations of uncertainty are important. In this context, predictive and 
technical information both matter for agricultural operations. Continuing to the right of 
Figure 1, marketing of outputs primarily requires price information. Increasingly, 
producing for sale also requires knowledge of quality requirements in different markets.
9 
Selling of produce provides income for consumption, investment and inputs (the reverse 
arrows in the figure), as well as generating information that affects input and production 
decisions. 
  
Non-production decisions of households can be roughly divided into pure 
consumption activities and human capital investment, in education and health. The 
boundary is fuzzy, since even basic food consumption has nutritional impacts and 
therefore a human capital component. These activities generate impacts on operations, 
since they affect the quality of decision-making, as well as household labor inputs: we 
indicate this with the vertical arrows. While poorer households may be severely limited in 
their consumption, a significant proportion of rural households in countries such as India 
have incomes sufficient to support some discretionary consumption. In some cases, 
consumption may be only superficially discretionary – social norms may dictate spending 
on activities relating to marriage and other life cycle events. Finally, the rightmost box 
captures household saving, again something that is not feasible for all rural households, 
but is an activity of growing importance. Saving may be for consumption smoothing, 
investment, or precautionary reasons. 
  
Even this simplified and summary picture of rural households’ economic activity 
illustrates that they engage in a broad range of transactions and decisions with economic 
impacts. What is noteworthy besides this complexity is that many decisions are made 
with very limited information, and that market interactions are often subject to high 
transaction costs, due to imperfections in information, high transportation costs, 
inefficient intermediation and time delays. High transaction costs will always prevent 
marginal transactions from being undertaken; in extreme cases, the market may fail to 
function at all. Given this situation, the potential role of IT can be understood in terms of 
reducing transaction costs, as well as improving the efficiency of decision making within 
households (both as producers and as consumers). 
  
Reductions in communication and transaction costs are particularly beneficial 
where they can allow new markets to develop, in the sense that existing goods and 
services, otherwise restricted to urban areas, or to a very limited segment of rural 
populations, now can be offered to broad cross-sections of the rural population. Examples 
                                                 
9 This reflects increased processing of food products, as well as greater exports to markets where regulatory 
standards for quality and consumer consciousness are significant. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  7
include financial services, particular types of education, health services, long distance 
communications, and expertise on a range of production-related decisions. Whether this 
can be done in a sustainable manner depends on the supply conditions for IT-based rural 
services. 
 
  It must be further understood that the activities outlined, in Figure 1 and the 
accompanying discussion, take place within a particular institutional environment. This 
includes private actors as well as governments. For example, farmers may obtain credit 
and inputs from, as well contract their output to, private ‘commission agents,’ even in the 
presence of government procurement and government-run local markets. Governments 
play a major role in subsidizing inputs, providing infrastructure, and enforcing property 
rights. To the extent that these activities are also subject to inefficiencies, it may be the 
case that, in order to be successful, IT-based interventions geared towards rural 
households will have to simultaneously alter the institutional environment, or else 
achieve sufficient scale and scope in order to impel changes in it. We will take this up 
later in the paper. 
 
 
3. Modeling Transaction Costs and Development 
 
The simplest and most basic aspect of transaction costs is that they result in 
resources used up in exchange, and drive a wedge between the supply price and the 
demand price. For example, in a linear model of competitive supply and demand (e.g., 
Bussolo and Whalley, 2002), we have  
 
d d bQ a P − =   (1)
s s Q c P + =   (2)
s d Q Q =   (3)
t P P s d + =   (4)
 
In equation (4), t is the unit transaction cost, which has a negative impact on 
equilibrium quantity, as seen in the following expression. 
 
d b
t c a
Qe +
− −
=  
(5)
 
If transaction costs are high enough, the market does not exist, in the sense that 
the quantity exchanged is zero. If the transaction cost is purely resources used up in the 
process of exchange, then the welfare loss from its existence consists of the usual 
Harberger deadweight loss triangle, as well as the rectangle tQe, which can be 
substantially larger. If the transaction cost is actually a payment to an intermediary, or a 
tax imposed by the government, then the welfare loss is just the Harberger triangle. One 
can argue that, if transaction costs are high, perhaps even high enough to lead to a zero 
equilibrium quantity, then even the Harberger triangle can be quite a substantial welfare 
loss, and this may be a useful point to make for developing countries such as India. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  8
 
Using the above model and variants, Bussolo and Whalley (2002) arrive at 
estimates of the welfare losses of transaction costs in general equilibrium in an open 
economy.
10 Their simulations consider 50% reductions in exogenous transaction costs in 
goods markets for all goods and all agents. Using data for the Indian economy, real 
household income in these simulations rises about 6% to 13%, depending on the specifics 
of the model. Bussolo (2001) performs a similar exercise with data for Colombia, and 
obtains real household income increases that range from about 2% to 13% for the various 
models. The gains here include the transaction cost rectangles, as well as the Harberger 
triangles. 
 
These exercises provide a useful indication of the static efficiency gains from 
reducing transaction costs, but that is all. They tell us nothing about the long run impacts 
on growth or development. Romer (1994), in an influential paper, argues that even if the 
rectangles represent a redistribution, and not a resource cost, there is a welfare cost that 
goes well beyond the usual Harberger triangles. The basic idea is that if there is a fixed 
cost of producing a good, transaction costs can reduce operating profits to the extent that 
some goods are no longer produced, leading to a larger loss of welfare than would 
otherwise be the case. Note that the transaction costs can be smaller than would be 
required to lead to zero quantity in the simple competitive case above. 
 
The essentials of Romer’s model and demonstration of welfare losses are as 
follows. Output is assumed to be a function of labor, L, and a large number of different 
types of capital goods, indexed by i. 
 
∑ =
α α − =
N
i i x L Y
1
1   (6)
 
This is a simple special case of a more general CES aggregation of the 
differentiated capital goods, where the CES parameter is assumed equal to α (Romer, 
1994, p. 27). Each of the capital goods has a fixed cost of production given by c0, and it is 
further assumed that the goods are arranged so that c0 is increasing in i, and that the 
dependence is linear, or c0(i) = µi. 
 
Romer focuses on tariffs as the transaction costs in this model, so all capital goods 
are assumed to be potentially produced by foreign entrepreneurs. The cost c0 in this case 
can be assumed to be an entry cost for the local market – the model is static at this stage. 
Good  N is the marginal good in the absence of transaction costs. There is a single 
producer of each type of capital good.
11 Since the capital goods enter the production 
                                                 
10 The CGE models used in this case have theoretical antecedents in treatments of general competitive 
equilibrium with transaction costs such as Foley (1970) and Hahn (1971). These models take the number of 
goods as given, and focus on existence of equilibrium rather than welfare issues. 
11 As pointed out to me by Abhijit Banerjee and Dilip Mookherjee, this is a significant assumption, since 
adjustment takes place at the level of varieties rather than the number of firms producing a particular 
variety. If there are several potential firms producing each variety, or if individual firms produce several 
varieties, the nature of competition and pricing becomes more complex, but it seems that fixed costs of Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  9
function (6) symmetrically, each of them faces the same inverse demand, given by the 
value of the marginal product of the input. Using the output as the numeraire, this is 
simply the marginal product, so that the inverse demand for good i is  
 
1 1 ) (
− α α − α = i i i x L x p   (7)
 
There is an ad valorem tariff, t, on all of the purchases of the foreign capital 
goods, so that if the firm selling good i chooses to enter, its profit maximization problem 
is  
max x  x c x x p t i 1 ) ( ) 1 ( − −   (8)
 
Here c1 is the constant marginal cost of production. The result of this maximization is a 
proportional markup on marginal cost 
 
) 1 ( / ) ( 1
* t c t pi − α =   (9)
 
Substituting this in (7), we solve for equilibrium output, assuming that the producer is 
profitable.  
 
L t c t x
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 /( 1
1
) 1 /( 2 * ) 1 ( ) (
α − α − − α − − α =   (10)
 
Also, substituting (9) in (8), we have that equilibrium profit, before fixed costs of entry 
are deducted, is 
 
α α − / ) 1 )( (
*
1 t x c   (11)
 
Equating this to c0(i) = µi and solving, we derive the expression for the marginal good in 
equilibrium: 
 
αµ α − = / ) 1 )( ( ) (
*
1 t x c t N   (12)
 
Domestic income is obtained by substituting (10) and (12) in (6), and national 
income is given by   
 
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t Y t t Y t Y DOM DOM NAT α + α − =   (13)
 
The first term on the right hand side of (13) is labor’s share of domestic product, while 
the second term is tariff revenue. Romer goes on to demonstrate the difference in welfare 
cost when the number of capital goods in assumed to be fixed at N(0), versus the case 
where it is determined in equilibrium as a function of the tariff rate, t. In particular, he 
shows that, when α = 0.5, 
                                                                                                                                                 
producing varieties will still have the same effect, in that transaction costs will reduce the number of 
varieties. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  10
 
2
) 0 ( ) 0 (
) (
1 t
Y
t Y
N N
NAT
NAT = − =  
(14)
 
whereas 
 
4 3 2 2
) 0 (
) (
1 t t t
Y
t Y
NAT
NAT + − = −  
(15)
 
In the first case, a tariff rate of 10% implies a drop in national income of 1%, but in the 
second case, where the impact of the tariff on the equilibrium number of capital goods 
used is accounted for, the decrease is 19.8%. 
 
  Romer’s important insight has led to several papers that try to quantify the 
impacts of trade liberalization on the economy, in terms of leading to new goods being 
traded. While these empirical studies do not necessarily correspond precisely to Romer’s 
theoretical model, they point out impacts of trade liberalization that are similar in spirit. 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) find substantial increases in the number of goods traded, for 
bilateral trade flows for the countries in NAFTA and in the European Union. Panagariya 
(2004) reports similar results for India, based on work by one of his doctoral students. 
Funke and Ruhwedel (2003) find substantial increases in product variety in international 
trade for 14 central and eastern European countries after the fall of the Soviet Union.
12
 
  The empirical studies above have all focused on tariffs as a cause of suboptimal 
product variety and resultant welfare losses. As Romer (1994) notes in his general 
discussion, but does not emphasize in his modeling, his insight applies to any form of 
transaction costs, not just tariffs.
13 Thus, communication and search costs for domestic 
goods, which are most directly affected by information technology, can have the same 
effects. Therefore, suppose that the parameter, t, represents a resource cost for 
transactions that is proportional to revenue, but that the suppliers of the capital goods are 
domestic firms. Then we have 
 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t Y t t Y t Y DOM DOM NAT α − + α − =   (16)
 
The first term is the same as in equation (13), but the second term is the total payment 
received by the domestic capital goods producers.
14 In this case, again with α = 0.5, the 
                                                 
12 Hummels and Klenow (2002) also examine product variety in trade, but in the context of the impacts of 
countries’ size and other characteristics. 
13 In the context of international trade, iceberg trade costs (which include transportation costs), as applied 
by, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) are modeled similarly. 
14 Here we assume that the resources used up by transaction costs are simply a waste, and do not show up in 
the national income accounting. On the other hand, fixed and variable costs of capital goods producers are 
payments to domestic labor, and so are included in national income. I am grateful to T.N. Srinivasan for 
clarifying this assumption. One can alter the specific assumptions of what is pure waste and what is paid to 
others, without altering the thrust of the calculations that follow. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  11
welfare loss when the reduction in the number of goods is accounted for is higher, but 
only by a multiple, and not an order of magnitude. Specifically, we have, 
 
  
2
) 0 ( 5 . 0 5 . 1
) 0 (
) (
1 t t
Y
t Y
N N
NAT
NAT − = − =  
(17)
and  
 
4 3 2 4 6 4
) 0 (
) (
1 t t t t
Y
t Y
NAT
NAT − + − = −  
(18)
 
Thus, transaction costs that are 5% of revenue result in income losses of approximately 
7.5% and 20%, respectively. 
 
Another possibility is that transaction costs are proportional to profit rather than 
revenue. In this case, the calculations must be modified more thoroughly. In particular, 
the equilibrium price becomes pi
* = c1/α, independent of t, and the expression for 
equilibrium use of the capital goods is also modified, and is independent of the 
transaction cost. However, profit still depends on t, and so does the number of capital 
goods produced and used. In this case, the Romer result on order of magnitude 
differences again does not hold, but, as in the previous case, there is a multiplier 
difference. In particular, for any α, 
 
t
Y
t Y
N N
NAT
NAT = − = ) 0 ( ) 0 (
) (
1  
(19)
 
while 
 
2 2
) 0 (
) (
1 t t
Y
t Y
NAT
NAT − = −  
(20)
 
  One should not read too much into the comparisons. In particular, they should not 
be used to infer that tariffs are worse than domestic transaction costs. The point is really 
to emphasize the generality of Romer’s insight. If one is interested in development, the 
main implication of domestic transaction costs, i.e., their effect on the equilibrium 
number of intermediate goods, and hence on output and welfare, must be sought in a 
dynamic model. Romer hints at this link, since he informally relates his discussion to the 
branch of “new” growth theory that emphasizes growth through endogenous innovation 
(Romer, 1994, p. 6). Here we make this connection somewhat more precise, using the 
analysis of Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996). 
 
  Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) use a dynamic monopolistic competition model, 
in which an economy that inherits a small range of differentiated intermediate inputs can Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  12
be trapped into a lower stage of development.
15 In particular, their model may have 
multiple steady state equilibria, and the starting point of the economy can determine 
which steady state is approached. How the intuition of the Romer model will be used is 
straightforward. If transaction costs determine the initial conditions in terms of the 
number of varieties of the intermediate good, then reducing transaction costs may jump 
start the economy, moving it to a path that leads to a higher steady state. In addition, 
transaction costs will affect the long-run equilibrium number of varieties, and hence the 
level of the steady state. We sketch a version of the Ciccone-Matsuyama model with the 
addition of transaction costs, and indicate how the impact of reduced transaction costs 
plays out in the context of the model. 
 
  The model is set in continuous time. In this economy households that supply labor 
inelastically, and have a logarithmic instantaneous utility function for the single 
consumption good.  Intertemporal utility maximization gives the standard Euler 
condition, where Ct is consumption, ρ is the subjective discount rate, and Rt is the 
cumulative interest factor up to time t. 
 
ρ − = t
t
t R
C
C &
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(21)
 
  The consumption good is produced by identical competitive firms, with CRS 
production technology described by ) , ( t t t H X F C = , where Ht is labor input (with 
competitive wage rate of wt) and Xt is the composite of the differentiated intermediate 
inputs, which, in this dynamic model, must be interpreted as perishable producer services 
rather than capital goods. However, this is basically the same specification as Romer 
(1994) and similar growth models. Here, a continuum of inputs is assumed, and, unlike in 
Romer’s example, the CES elasticity is not pinned down to any parameter of the 
production function, though it is assumed that σ > 1. We have 
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) 1 /(
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t t di i x X  
(22)
 
Growth in this economy comes about through an increase in the number of varieties of 
intermediate inputs, nt. In fact, factor productivity increases with the range of 
differentiated inputs. By symmetry, x(i) = x, so, from (22), the productivity of 
intermediate inputs is X/nx = n
1/(σ - 1), which is increasing in n as long as σ > 1. One way 
to introduce transaction costs into this framework is to assume that some fraction, say τ1, 
of the composite input Xt is consumed by such costs. In this case, the production function 
                                                 
15 As Ciccone and Matsuyama point out, their basic model is very similar to that of Grossman and Helpman 
(1991, Ch. 3.1) – the crucial difference being that substitution between labor and differentiated capital 
goods is allowed. This assumption drives the equilibrium possibilities discussed later in this paper. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  13
becomes . ) , ) 1 (( 1 t t t H X F C τ − =
16 However, we will pursue a more fruitful alternative 
below. 
 
  As in Romer (1994), and other such models, the supply of intermediate goods is 
characterized by monopolistic competition: each differentiated input is produced by a 
single firm, which faces a demand curve with constant price elasticity, σ. Each input uses 
only labor in production, with constant returns. Following Ciccone and Matsuyama, the 
unit labor requirement is aX, but the units of measurement are chosen to make this equal 
to (1 - 1/σ ). Profit maximization implies marginal revenue equals marginal cost, or, in 
the absence of transaction costs, 
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Using the normalization for aX, we have, simply, t t w i p = ) ( . If we introduce transaction 
costs at this stage of production, as in the static Romer (1994) model discussed earlier, 
the equilibrium price becomes, instead,  
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Using (24), the price index for the composite intermediate good is 
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Note that Pt is decreasing in nt, the number of varieties. 
 
Since the final goods sector is perfectly competitive, the gross share, say α, of the 
composite intermediate good in the final output is given by the expression FXX/F, but 
only a fraction, (1-τ2), is received by the intermediate goods firms, while the remaining 
fraction is lost through transaction costs. With transaction costs in the use of the 
composite input, FX  = (1-τ1)F1, so transaction costs also reduce the input’s share by 
reducing its marginal productivity. Also, since F is a CRS function, the input share 
depends only on the relative input price, so α = α(P/w). For simplicity, we shall focus 
only on the second source of transaction costs, and set τ1 equal to zero for the rest of the 
analysis. Using (25), we have, 
 
) , ( )) 1 /( ( 2 2
) 1 /( 1 τ ≡ τ − α = α
σ −
t t t n A n   (26)
 
                                                 
16 It is important to reiterate that the transaction cost parameters in these abstract models can have varying 
interpretations, and can stand for a wide range of technologically- or policy-induced costs: this is to be 
expected at this level of abstraction. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  14
The function A is increasing in nt, as long as the elasticity of substitution between X and 
H, say θ, is greater than one: Ciccone and Matsuyama provide references that argue for 
the empirical plausibility of this assumption. The function A now also depends on τ2, and 
will be decreasing in the second argument as long as θ > 1. Intuitively, as intermediate 
goods producers increase prices to compensate for transaction costs, higher 
substitutability of labor for their inputs reduces their share. Their net share, (1-τ2)α, is 
even lower, and is also decreasing in τ2. 
 
  For any variety, using symmetry, we can drop the index i, and write net profit as  
 
σ τ − = − τ − = π / ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( 2 2 t t t t X t t x p x w a p   (27)
 
Now, net revenue for all varieties of the intermediate goods is 
, where the right hand side is the net input share. However, 
consumption is now less than output, as a result of the transaction costs measured by τ
t t t t t F x p n α τ − = τ − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 2
2.  
The share of output lost through these transaction costs is  2 τ αt . Hence, the share of 
intermediate goods firms in consumption is  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( 2 2 τ α − τ − α t t . Hence, we get, using 
(26),
17
 
σ τ τ − τ − τ = π t t t t t n n A C n A ) ) , ( 1 /( ) 1 )( , ( 2 2 2 2   (28)
  
  Following Ciccone and Matsuyama, assume that the number of firms starts at n0, 
that there is free entry subject to a start-up cost of an units of labor per intermediate 
variety, and that these costs are financed through issuing ownership shares.
18 Let vt be the 
value of any intermediate goods firm.  Then, in equilibrium, we have: 
 
0 ) ( , 0 , = − ≥ ≥ t t n t t t n t n v a w n v a w & &   (29)
 
Since the market value of an intermediate goods firm is equal to the present value of its 
profits, we get 
 
t t t t R v v & & = + π / ) (   (30)
 
Letting V = v/C, and using (21), 28) and (30), we get  
 
σ τ τ − τ − τ − ρ = t t t t t n n A n A V V ) ) , ( 1 /( ) 1 )( , ( 2 2 2 2 & (31)
 
                                                 
17 This equation reduces to equation (7) in Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) when transaction costs are zero. 
18 These start-up costs can also involve transaction costs. Romer quotes de Soto (1989), in reference to a 
test case conducted in Peru in 1983, where it took four university students 289 days of full time work to get 
the 11 permits needed to legally open a small garment assembly shop. Such transaction costs may also be 
reduced by the use of IT, though clearly policy changes are also required. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  15
When   (31) yields the equivalent of Ciccone and Matsuyama’s (VV) curve 
(expressing V as a function of n) in a phase diagram of the economy’s dynamics.
0 = t V &
19 In our 
case, the curve depends also on τ2, and shifts in V-n space as τ2 changes. The nature of 
this shift depends on how the term  ) ) , ( 1 /( ) 1 )( , ( 2 2 2 2 τ τ − τ − τ t t n A n A responds to changes 
in τ2.  A necessary and sufficient condition for this expression to be decreasing in τ2 is 
that  is increasing in τ 2 2) , ( τ τ t n A 2. We shall assume that this property holds, so that the 
(VV) curve shifts downward as τ2 increases. We discuss the implications of this property 
later in this analysis. Note that as long as  ) , ( 2 τ t n A  is increasing in n, then so is the term 
: hence the qualitative properties of the VV-locus are 
unaffected by the presence of transaction costs. 
) ) , ( 1 /( ) 1 )( , ( 2 2 2 2 τ τ − τ − τ t t n A n A
 
  Next, assuming that the total supply of labor is L, equilibrium in the labor market 
is given by  
 
t X t t t n x a n H n a L + + = &   (32)
 
We substitute the following equalities, for payments to intermediate goods and labor in 
the production of the final good, into (32): 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 2 2 τ α − τ − α = = τ − t t t t t t t t t C x w n x p n  
) 1 /( ) 1 ( 2 2 τ α − τ − α − = t t t t t C H w  
 
Hence, we have 
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This simplifies to  
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This equation generalizes (10) in Ciccone and Matsuyama, and, rearranging and using 
(29), we have the analogue of their equation (13b): 
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Setting the first term in the outside brackets equal to zero, and expressing V as a function 
of n (and τ), one obtains the generalization of Ciccone and Matsuyama’s (NN) curve in 
V-n space . Differentiation with respect to τ2 shows that the (NN) curve shifts upward as 
                                                 
19 Equation (31) reduces to (13a) in Ciccone and Matsuyama when transaction costs are zero. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  16
transaction costs increase, given our assumption that  2 2) , ( τ τ t n A is increasing in τ2. Note 
that here the impact of an increase in transaction costs is similar to that of an increase in 
start-up costs, but the latter has no impact on the (VV) curve. 
 
  We can now begin to discuss the dynamic implications of transaction costs in this 
model, i.e., the implications for development. First, consider the case, where θ  ≤σ. 
Ciccone and Matsuyama show that there is a unique intersection of the (VV) and (NN) 
curves, which is the lowest steady state equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 2, where the 
intersection occurs at n*. If the economy begins to the left of n*, it converges to n*. To 
the right of n*, the number of intermediate goods firms does not change, and the 
economy stays on the corresponding point on (VV). Here, initial conditions do not matter 
‘too much’, since any economy starting to the left of n* will end up at the same steady 
state. Thus, the impact of transaction costs on initial conditions, as emerges from the 
Romer (1994) model, is muted in the long run. However, transaction costs affect the 
steady state itself, as one would expect. An increase in τ2 shifts (VV) downward and 
(NN) upward, thereby reducing n*, and hence the long run level of development. 
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 Alternatively,  if  F has a CES form with θ >σ , Ciccone and Matsuyama illustrate 
three possibilities, as shown in Figure 3a-c.
20 Now (VV) is no longer downward sloping 
everywhere, but has the possible humped shape as illustrated. In Figure 3a, (NN) lies 
completely above (VV), and any point on (VV) is a steady state – no development takes 
place. In Figure 3b, (NN) intersects (VV) twice, both where (VV) is downward sloping. 
If the economy starts below nL*, it stays there, on (VV). Slightly above this level, it 
converges to nH*. Finally, in Figure 3c, (NN) intersects (VV) twice, the lower 
intersection being where (VV) is upward sloping. In this case, even if n0 is just below 
nL*, expectations that are optimistic enough may generate dynamics that take the 
                                                 
20 This can be generalized to non-CES forms, as is made clear in Ciccone and Matsuyama’s Proposition 2. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  17
economy to the steady state with nH* intermediate goods firms. It is clear that transaction 
costs have two potential impacts, in this case. First, they can reduce n0, and thereby 
increase the likelihood that the economy stays in a low-level equilibrium. Second, by 
shifting the (NN) and (VV) curves, they can reduce the likelihood that any given n0 is 
high enough to generate development, and, even if development takes place, they can 
reduce the long run equilibrium level of development. Thus, for example, lowering 
transaction costs might shift the economy from case 3a to case 3b, and ‘get it going’ out 
of an initial stagnant state. 
 
  To summarize the entire modeling exercise, we have proceeded by examining 
three levels of impact of transaction costs. First, there are the standard direct resource 
costs, which are larger than just the deadweight loss triangles. These resource costs are 
well understood and widely acknowledged. Second, there are additional losses of 
consumer surplus through reductions in the number of varieties produced. These costs 
were highlighted by Romer (1994), with an emphasis on tariffs, but also with a clear 
statement that the analysis applies to general transaction costs. The Romer analysis is still 
static, but points the way toward incorporation in a dynamic model. We have done this 
here by extending a model of Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996). The third impact of 
transaction costs is in possibly arresting the process of development, and/or reducing its 
long-run level. We relate this abstract discussion to case studies of IT use for transaction 
cost reduction in the next section. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  18
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4. Rural Information Technology Use in India 
 
  In this section, we use case studies from India to illustrate the potential impact of 
IT on rural development, particularly through the reduction of transaction costs. We can 
relate the discussion to the model sketched in the previous section by interpreting the 
intermediate goods in the model either as the outputs of rural farm households, or as their 
inputs – in the latter case, we think of the homogeneous final good as ‘food,’ or whatever 
crop is being grown. Either interpretation is possible, because it appears that both the 
range of inputs used by farmers in developing countries such as India, and the range of 
outputs that they produce, are constrained by high transaction costs. Our goal is to 
provide concrete illustrations of transaction costs reductions and their effects.
21 In 
practice, their full impact remains to be seen, both in terms of static efficiency gains and 
of long run growth. In that respect, the link between the case studies and the modeling is 
tentative: nevertheless, this paper represents a significant first attempt to provide 
conceptual underpinnings for the understanding the development impacts of rural IT use 
in developing countries. Our discussion of several rural-IT initiatives in India is based on 
field visits conducted over a two-and-a-half year period, from December 2001 to July 
2004, as well as discussions with various members of each organization.
22  
 
Drishtee 
Drishtee.com had its origins in Gyandoot, a government project in Dhar district of 
Madhya Pradesh, in central India. Gyandoot provided an intranet for 33 village 
information kiosks, offering a range of mainly e-governance-related services. The most 
prominent of these was land record certificates, which are needed by landowners for 
transactions such as sale or leasing of land. While Gyandoot was a specific local 
initiative, involving heavy support from the local administration, Drishtee has attempted 
to take that model and rapidly replicate it across the country. Currently, Drishtee has 
approximately 100 rural Internet kiosks in several states, run by franchisees according to 
a revenue sharing arrangement. In Drishtee’s case, a kiosk has, at least initially, just one 
computer. The set-up cost is in the range of Rs. 50,000 (approximately US $1,000). A 
Drishtee kiosk is designed to serve about 10,000 people, and their target is to support 
50,000 kiosks. 
 
With the origins in Gyandoot playing a role, simple e-governance, such as making 
government forms available and allowing a variety of complaints to be relayed to the 
district level government, has typically been the lead service in setting up operations in a 
new district. In this context, informal partnerships with district level government officials 
                                                 
21 We will not discuss issues of implementation and commercial feasibility. Those aspects are outlined in 
Singh (2004), on which this section does draw heavily. However, it is worth emphasizing here that falling 
costs of hardware, development of local software applications, and significant organizational innovations 
have all made rural IT provision at least close to economically sustainable on a large scale. In this 
interpretation of the model of Section 3, the provision of IT-based services to farmers represents new 
varieties of intermediate producer services, or lower transaction costs for existing services. In this case, a 
single firm may provide several varieties of services. 
22 It is important to reemphasize that the following is a subjective assessment, and does not reflect the 
views of any of the individuals or the organizations they represent. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  20
(both state and local government employees) have been very significant. For example, in 
Sirsa and Jaipur districts, Drishtee has been able to act as a significant intermediary for 
information exchange between the district government and constituents. It obviously 
remains limited in its ability to improve the internal functioning of government. 
Expanding the range of services has meant tying up with content partners, particularly 
organizations such as Agriwatch, which provides a substantial quantity and range of 
agricultural information to farmers, including global market prices, crop research, 
weather information, and web store fronts for inputs. Agriwatch is essentially developing 
into a large-scale Internet portal for farmers, and Drishtee’s role can be seen as providing 
last-mile access to this rich information, through its kiosks. It is difficult to quantify the 
benefits of this service, but its popularity with farmers suggests that it is valuable. Related 
examples from the cases of ITC and n-Logue will provide a more definite assessment of 
these benefits.   
 
Drishtee’s pricing scheme for e-governance services follows a set model. The full 
cost of a transaction such as obtaining, filling out and submitting a government form is 
estimated, including imputing the value of time spent in travel. The kiosk owner’s fee for 
this is then set at about 10 percent of the estimated transaction cost, also taking into 
account possible willingness-to-pay considerations in choosing “pricing points” such as 
Rs. 5, 10 or 20. Assuming that these fees can cover the full cost of the kiosk owner and 
Drishtee (which depends largely on generating sufficient volume) the saving in 
transaction costs is substantial. The savings in such cases are generated by reductions in 
travel and time costs. There may also be benefits in terms of improving the effectiveness 
of transactions (e.g., if a complaint through this channel s more likely to be addressed), 
but these are harder to quantify. 
 
In the case of other services, such as matching buyers and sellers, or providing 
horoscopes or matrimonial advertising, additional services require partners who can 
provide software, maintenance, content or other components of the complete service. 
Education has played a limited role in Drishtee’s offerings, though kiosk owners have 
often used the presence of a computer and peripherals to offer computer training, as well 
as other offline services such as printing and games. The benefits in these examples are 
reductions in transaction costs for existing transactions, improved quality of successful 
matches, and potentially most significant, completion of investment and consumption 
activities (e.g., training, entertainment, and long-distance communications) that would 
otherwise not take place because of high transaction costs. 
 
Aksh 
  Aksh is essentially a fiber optic cable company, with its core competence in 
laying and maintaining cable. Its revenue model is driven by the content and data that can 
be delivered over this cable. Therefore it has an interest in increasing such content 
delivery. While urban areas in India have seen substantial penetration of cable TV, 
through a model of largely unregulated local operators, the rural market remains largely 
unserved.
23 The bottleneck has been the lack of last mile infrastructure, since there are a 
                                                 
23 Under pressure from content providers, the government, through the Telecoms Regulatory Authority of 
India, is attempting to regulate urban cable TV markets more stringently. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  21
significant percentage of rural households (especially in richer districts) that can afford 
cable TV. Aksh, along with other companies such as Reliance, has received licenses for 
laying a new fiber optic network in rural areas. In the case in point, Aksh rapidly laid a 
large fiber optic network in rural Jaipur district (excluding the city itself). It initially 
partnered with Drishtee for the development and maintenance of kiosks that would act as 
distribution points for cable TV access, as well as Internet kiosks. The Drishtee franchise 
model, interface and services were adopted, but with the brand name of “Gramdoot.” 
Now Aksh serves as the main service provider, with Drishtee reduced to the role of 
providing software and related services.
24  
 
The history of Aksh’s initiative means that the range of services provided in their 
kiosks, the revenue model, and pricing structures currently follow the Drishtee model. 
Hence the earlier discussion of benefits transfers over to this case. The importance of 
cable TV revenues, however, suggests that these kiosks may emphasize a range of 
entertainment services more than utility services such as agriculture-related information 
or e-governance. It is conceivable, however, that kiosk operators will be able to span the 
entire range of services. The bandwidth available will certainly support a full range of 
offerings, and the issues will be managerial attention and the perceptions of rural users. 
One important implication of greater bandwidth is that video interactions are possible, 
and Drishtee and Aksh have been able to test several communication services based on 
this. The power of video over text is in increasing the richness of information exchange, 
as well as greatly increasing the attractiveness and acceptance of all the services offered 
by the kiosks. 
 
N-Logue 
  While Drishtee is mostly active in northern and eastern India, n-Logue has its 
origin in the south of India, and its chief presence there and in western India. It is a for-
profit corporation, with majority ownership residing with a nonprofit organization. The 
main impetus for n-Logue came from the IIT Chennai research group headed by an IIT 
professor, Ashok Jhunjhunwala. This group has been responsible for a stream of 
hardware and software innovations that enable rural IT-based service delivery, through 
connectivity and applications. The core innovation at the heart of n-Logue’s operations is 
a Wireless-in-Local-Loop (WLL) technology that provides joint wireless Internet and 
voice connectivity. The kiosk-level hardware is relatively inexpensive, and adds only 
marginally to the overall cost of a kiosk. However, the construction of WLL towers and 
maintenance of the WLL hub is relatively costly, and this fixed cost requires a substantial 
density of kiosks within a particular radius of the tower. The n-Logue model is designed 
to achieve this density, with kiosks generating returns from fairly small user populations. 
In fact, n-Logue claims to be able to make kiosks commercially viable serving 
populations as small as 1500. With a goal of 500,000 kiosks, it aims to eventually serve 
750 million people, or virtually all of India’s rural and small town population. N-Logue is 
the currently the second largest organization in this field, supporting over 1000 rural-IT 
kiosks. 
                                                 
24 There are several reasons for this shift in the business relationship, including Aksh’s far greater resources 
and capabilities, the different needs of the cable TV business, and Aksh’s incentive to control and brand the 
effort to score points for corporate social responsibility. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  22
 
N-Logue has progressed well beyond being simply a connectivity provider, to 
delivering a range of services – these can be adapted to different connectivity 
technologies. The WLL technology overcomes lack of dial-up connectivity, and provides 
an extra revenue stream for kiosk operators, through voice calls. Furthermore, it has 
greater bandwidth than traditional fixed line dial-up, which allows a wide range of 
applications to be delivered. In particular, the IIT Chennai group has been able to develop 
video applications that are sufficiently compressed to work within the constraints of the 
WLL. The close links with the IIT Chennai group have given n-Logue access to a range 
of software innovations for delivery and implementation of various applications in the 
fields of education, health and agriculture. For example, web cams have been used for 
remote diagnostics for diseases of people, animals and plants. Distance learning programs 
have also been developed. A considerable amount of local language software has been 
created quite rapidly and effectively to support these applications. In many of these cases, 
the transactions (eye exam, animal check-up, learning basic computer skills, etc.) would 
not have taken place for many of the households involved, because the costs of obtaining 
these services by more traditional means would have been too high. In most of these 
cases, the services provided can be viewed as new, productivity-enhancing inputs into the 
production of rural households. This availability of new producer services represents the 
connection with the formal model developed in Section 3. 
 
N-Logue has also been able to build partnerships for the delivery of additional 
services. ICICI Bank, headquartered in Mumbai in western India, is piloting various 
financial services products, including insurance and banking, in kiosks in Madurai and 
Thirupattur districts in the state of Tamil Nadu. The use of IT kiosks for delivering rural 
financial services is perhaps potentially the most significant example of reducing 
transaction costs.
25 Despite some headway made by nationalized banks and credit 
cooperatives in serving rural markets, it is not difficult to come across cases of farmers 
paying monthly interest rates that equal, in percentage terms, what corporate or urban 
household borrowers pay per annum. Bank credit is often not available to small farmers, 
precisely because the transaction costs are too high for rural branches of nationalized 
banks. Microcredit has filled some of the gap, but it remains relatively small in total, 
reflecting its own high transaction costs when scaling up is attempted.
26 Rural IT kiosks 
may provide low cost delivery points for rural financial services that occupy an empty 
space between microcredit at the low end, and traditional bank branches and cooperatives 
at the high end.  
 
One of the barriers to rural credit provision at reasonable interest rates is the 
continued existence of interlinking.
27 Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not just a characteristic 
                                                 
25 In fact, ICICI bank is working with several rural IT initiatives in other areas of India, in addition to n-
Logue and Drishtee. For example, see ICICI Bank (2004). 
26 For example, Nancy Barry, President Women's World Banking (WWB), USA, states that “You need to 
recognize the transaction costs are high in microfinance… focus on cutting transaction costs in 
microfinance through new technology and channels” Barry (2004). 
27 On this point, see the perceptive comments in Bardhan (1989), where the role of transaction costs in 
interlinking is emphasized. Ray and Sengupta (1989) provide a formal analysis of different types of Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  23
of ‘backward’ states such as Bihar. For example, in the relatively high-income state of 
Punjab, cotton farmers still rely on commission agents who provide input credit, 
guaranteed purchases of output, and some implicit insurance. Reducing transaction costs 
of alternative sources of credit may not be enough to overcome high switching costs in 
such cases, unless transaction costs in input and output markets are also reduced. IT 
kiosks have this precise capability. For example, in Nellikuppam district of Tamil Nadu, 
n-Logue has partnered with EID-Parry to improve sugar farmers’ access to information, 
and reduce their transactions costs in dealing with Parry’s large sugar factory in the 
district, through improved tracking and settlements of payments.
28 Combining this 
approach to marketing farmers’ output with new credit channels may provide an 
alternative to traditional interlinking of input credit and output purchases. Parry also 
plans to use those kiosks that are under its own brand (several dozen in total) to offer 
processed foods to farmers. Thus, it is possible that IT kiosks can reduce transaction costs 
(and expand variety) in three different markets: farm inputs, farm outputs, and 
manufactured products (of which processed foods are one example). 
 
ITC 
ITC stands out among the firms considered here, since it is a large Indian 
corporation serving global markets. Its kiosks are called e-choupals, and they have 
several differentiating features. The key distinguishing factor is that the e-choupals are 
totally designed to support ITC’s agricultural products supply chain. This gives them a 
focus that is not present even in EID-Parry’s kiosks in Nellikuppam. In addition, the e-
choupals are totally owned and set up by ITC, with the operators not having any 
investment or risk of their own. Furthermore, e-choupal operators are, because of the 
focus, always relatively well-off farmers, with social standing in the village, and 
therefore they are always male. All these features make the e-choupals different from the 
previous three initiatives. There are four kinds of e-choupals, tailored very specifically 
for four different products: shrimp, coffee, wheat and soybeans. The first two of these 
involve large commercial farmers, and the focus is on creating Internet access to global 
market information to guide production and supply decisions. There are a few dozen of 
these e-choupals. In the case of wheat and soybeans, there are many small farmers, and 
over 3,000 e-choupals have been set up, in several states of India. 
  
The description in this paper is based on soy-choupals in Madhya Pradesh state. 
Wheat-choupals are somewhat similar, though the final market and products are 
somewhat different. Soybeans are pressed to extract oil, which is sold domestically, while 
the remainder is exported as animal feed. Thus they are a cash crop, without the regulated 
market conditions or subsistence consumption associated with a food grain such as 
wheat. Soy-choupals are used as registry points for procurement of soybeans. Actual 
procurement is done at factories and warehouse hubs, but the initial logging in is done 
through the e-choupal, which provides price information and therefore price certainty. In 
fact, the e-choupal price acts as a floor price for procurement – the factory or warehouse 
                                                                                                                                                 
interlinking, and further references. Bardhan and Rudra (1978) performed the seminal empirical work on 
interlinking. For recent empirical work on interlinking in Punjab, see Gill (2003). 
28 In this case, the factory chimney has also served as a base for the tower, and the control hub is housed in 
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price can be higher. E-choupals also provide access to local market (mandi) prices and 
global market price information on soybeans and derivative products, to allow farmers to 
compare prices. They give access to operational information, developed by ITC experts, 
pertaining to cropping, seeds, fertilizer, and so on. 
  
E-choupals are set up by ITC, with solar power backup and VSAT connectivity. 
The equipment cost for the e-choupal is borne by ITC, with the selected farmer providing 
the location. E-choupal farmers take an oath to serve the village, and they are trained by 
ITC. While there is an important element of social pressure and pride of work, the 
operators also receive commissions on soybean shipments booked through the e-
choupals. This provides substantial revenue to the e-choupal operator. The narrow (at 
least initial) focus of the e-choupals and the substantial commitment of financial and 
human resources by ITC has made rapid expansion possible, as well as quick acceptance 
by farmers. The longer-term goal is to use e-choupals and warehouse hubs as sales points 
for soybean oil, tractor rentals, and eventually a range of ITC-produced consumer goods. 
  
The initial benefits of the ITC effort include a substantial reduction in transaction 
costs, from approximately 8 percent of a transaction, down to about 2 percent. It is 
estimated that these gains are shared roughly equally between ITC and individual 
farmers. Some of this gain may be at the expense of traditional intermediaries, who 
operate in mandis, but much of it comes from genuine efficiency gains, including clearer 
quality guidelines and measurement, greater timeliness and reduced wait times, quicker 
payments, and reduced uncertainties. To some extent, traditional intermediaries are co-
opted in the new process, by being hired to perform tasks such as handling payments at 
ITC’s receiving points. Note that traditional intermediaries often have monopoly power, 
which drives a wedge between buyers and sellers that exceeds the value of the services 
provided. In that sense, IT reduces transaction costs by also providing competition in 
intermediation – this is related to the earlier discussion of credit markets.
29 Finally, while 
a 6 percent or lower saving may seem quite small, it is worth noting that this is a 
percentage of gross revenue. Hence, it is likely to be a much larger fraction of value 
added. For example, if a farmer’s net profit rate on a transaction is 25 percent of revenue 
before transaction costs, a gain of 3 percent on the transaction through reduced 
transaction costs represents a 12 percent increase in profit. 
 
  Clearly the use of information technology is just a part of ITC’s overhaul of its 
supply chain, but speedy delivery of complex information pertaining to market conditions 
makes IT essential. It might be asked what acts as a check on ITC’s market power in this 
process. The traditional mandi (grain market) system, with its accompanying government 
regulation and oversight, acts as continuing competition. More significantly, ITC’s 
concern with its reputation acts as a disciplining device. Finally, the long-term goal of 
selling back to farmers as customers also gives ITC an incentive to cultivate relationships 
                                                 
29 Of course, IT is not the only possible source of transaction cost reductions, and in some cases, it may be 
of no value. In the ITC case, the value of the information and implicit insurance provided is all dependent 
on the existence of physical market access by road, and ITC’s procurement infrastructure. In other cases, 
however, such as education, crop information, and preliminary medical diagnosis, IT may be valuable even 
in the absence of a transportation infrastructure. I am grateful to T. N. Srinivasan for clarifying this point. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  25
with individual farmers. In fact, farmers view ITC as treating them with much greater 
respect and dignity than is the case in traditional mandi interactions. 
 
It is possible that the ITC model will not broaden significantly beyond the two-
way flow of agricultural produce from farmers to ITC, and processed foods, consumer 
goods and inputs from ITC to farmers, without extending to e-governance, entertainment, 
health or education-related services. Instead, other firms may provide these services in 
similar locations to ITC e-choupals. In any case, all the different IT implementation 
models illustrate substantial savings of transaction costs, and indicate that the result may 
be new transactions and new products being offered. 
  
  The four organizations discussed above are just some of the increasing number of 
rural IT providers in India. In addition to these private initiatives, there are also various 
government efforts. There are also more focused examples of IT use for reducing 
transaction costs, such as the case of milk cooperatives, where measurement, quality 
testing, and payment are all facilitated by IT use, reducing transaction costs substantially. 
While in most cases the gains are difficult to measure, whatever quantitative estimates 
there are suggest that transaction costs can be reduced substantially through the use of IT. 
While the net resource saving must also take account of the fixed costs of setting up and 
maintaining the IT infrastructure, the performance of rural IT kiosks run as franchises 
indicates that they are often able to cover all running costs as well as the cost of capital. 
There is also accumulating evidence of new goods and services being provided to rural 
households through these IT kiosks. While there is no direct confirmation of the 
theoretical model of Section 3, one can argue that the model is indicative of the process 
of development that might be stimulated by the deep penetration of IT in rural areas in 
developing countries. 
 
 
5. Information Technology and Development: Closing Thoughts  
 
While the empirical evidence we have provided for the possible positive impacts 
of IT on development came from rural India, one can argue that similar benefits might be 
attainable throughout the economy. To the extent that India, or any developing country, is 
a high transaction cost economy, anything that reduces these transaction costs (whether 
through policy or technology) anywhere in the economy can play a role in stimulating 
development. In particular, if IT can reduce transaction costs for the modern 
manufacturing or services sectors in India, it can have a positive impact there as well. 
India’s use of IT for providing all kinds of outsourcing services to global markets is one 
possible example, since IT’s key role in that case is reducing long-distance 
communication costs. In this paper, we have focused on rural IT use because it is perhaps 
the most striking case, and because the majority of the population of developing countries 
lives in rural areas. 
 
Furthermore, in working out the positive impacts of IT on economic growth, we 
have focused in this paper on the channel of reduced transaction costs. However, IT can 
have several other channels of impact, and we close with a brief discussion of these. For Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  26
example, if IT increases the efficiency of education delivery to the broader population, 
this investment in people (human capital acquisition) is also likely to lead to higher 
growth.
30 IT may also have positive impacts through impacts on the innovation process. 
For example, IT can make innovation easier by allowing simulation and low-cost testing 
of new designs or searching through possible chemical compounds for beneficial drugs. 
Also, IT may speed the diffusion of innovations through better communications, which 
may stimulate further innovation. 
 
  A growth model that captures well the special role of IT in economic growth, as 
an enabler of efficient communication and storage of information, is an extension of the 
recombinant growth model of Weitzman (1998). The central idea of this approach is that 
new ideas are formed through combinations of old ideas. A key property of this 
formulation is that the increase in the number of ideas is faster than geometric growth 
(Weitzman, 1998, Lemma, p. 338). The rate at which potential ideas are converted into 
new ones depends on the level of resources spent per potential ‘hybrid seed idea’, i.e., 
R&D. If one modifies Weitzman’s model to allow the stock of IT knowledge to 
independently affect this success rate, IT gives the growth process an extra ‘kick’, 
beyond that which comes from recombinant growth in general.
31  
 
  Some final impacts of IT on development, broadly defined, emerge from the India 
case studies. A factor that seemed to emerge in all cases was the greater average success 
of women kiosk operators, possibly reflecting the fact that there is greater untapped 
potential for rural women, given their otherwise more restricted employment 
opportunities. Certainly, rural IT kiosks provide an important new employment avenue 
for women who are constrained by social norms from commuting or migrating for work. 
For both women and men, the kiosk operations were often viewed as boosting self-
esteem, capabilities and awareness of possibilities. This extended beyond the operators 
themselves, to the rural clientele. Children, in particular, were quick to see and seize 
possibilities associated with IT use, including learning new skills, communicating more 
widely, and improving their entertainment options. These observations can also be related 
to the growth model considered in Section 3: in case 3c, the dynamics of the economy 
depended on expectations, and anything that makes these expectations more positive may 
have long-run impacts.
32 In cases where e-governance services were introduced, there 
was a heightened awareness of civic roles and the responsibilities of government at the 
local level. While one cannot claim that IT automatically provides all these benefits, it is 
certainly the case, that by providing large scale and widespread access to new 
information, and to new transaction opportunities in an affordable manner, IT appears to 
be poised to play a broad role in economic development in countries such as India. 
 
 
                                                 
30 For example, Lucas (1988) is an early growth model emphasizing human capital. Barro (2001) is one of 
many empirical studies exploring the relationship between human capital and growth. 
31 See Singh (2003) for details of the model and further discussion. 
32 This argument has been made informally, in the context of India’s success in software exports (Kapur, 
2002). Rural IT penetration potentially extends these optimistic expectations to a much broader population. Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development  27
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